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Abstract: This paper discusses the implications of a pluralistic approach to human rights and cos-
mopolitanism. This goal is pursued in a few steps. First, I introduce the topic of pluralism in terms of 
multicultural plurality and intercultural plurality in light of Karl Jaspers’ philosophy of the Axial Age, 
which is a way of recognizing a variety of cultural and religious worldviews. Second, I turn to philo-
sophers such as John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and Charles Taylors in order to discuss the possibility 
of an overlapping consensus among different cultural and religious views and postulate that they see 
this possible unenforced consensus as a way to af?irm the universality of human rights. Finally, I offer 
a proposal for a more plural approach to human rights in which the af?irmation of plurality of cultu-
res is not seen as incompatible with universality of human rights. I conclude that one way of moving 
beyond particularism to af?irm universality is to differentiate between multicultural plurality and 
intercultural plurality, which are complementary ways to recognize, support, and promote human 
rights around the world.
Keywords: Human Rights; Multiculturalism; Interculturalism.
Resumo: Este artigo discute as implicações de uma abordagem pluralista dos direitos humanos 
e o cosmopolitismo. Esse objetivo é perseguido em algumas etapas. Primeiro, introduz o tema do 
pluralismo em termos de pluralidade multicultural e intercultural à luz de Karl Jaspers, que é uma 
forma de reconhecer uma variedade de visões de mundo sobre cultura e religião. Em segundo 
lugar, dirige-se a ϐilósofos como John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum e Charles Taylor, a ϐim de discutir a 
possibilidade de um consenso sobreposto entre os diferentes pontos de vistas sobre cultura e reli-
gião e postula que haja esse possível consenso como uma maneira de aϐirmar a universalidade dos 
8 AMOS NASCIMENTO
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v. 1 | n. 1 | p. 7 - 26 | jul./dez. 2015
direitos humanos. Finalmente, oferece uma proposta para uma abordagem mais plural dos direitos 
humanos em que a aϐirmação da pluralidade de culturas não é vista como incompatível com a 
universalidade dos direitos humanos. Conclui que uma forma de ultrapassar o particularismo para 
aϐirmar a universalidade é diferenciar a pluralidade multicultural e intercultural, que são maneiras 
complementares para reconhecer, apoiar e promover os direitos humanos em todo o mundo.
Palavras-chave: Direitos Humanos; Multiculturalismo; Interculturalismo.
Summary: I. A Possible Model of Global Plurality: Worldviews and the Axial Age; 
II. Overlapping Consensus: From Plural Worldviews to Universal of Human Ri-
ghts; III. Politics, Law, and Plural Worldviews in relation to Human Rights. Refe-
rences.
To talk about “multiculturalism, interculturalism, and human rights” re-
quires us to consider a thematic relationship that is very polemic in mainline 
academia. These themes are separated according to speciϐic contexts and areas 
of expertise, indicating the lack of a more global and interdisciplinary approach 
capable of articulating politics, law, social issues, and cultural realities in a wider 
framework. Each of these topics corresponds to areas that are now being ques-
tioned on various grounds – as seen in the critique of constitutional privilege and 
the promotion of cultural rights, including religious expressions. Yet, these po-
lemic issues have been addressed more systematically by philosophers such as 
John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Judith Butler, Charles Taylor, Jacques Derrida, Mar-
tha Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam, and Giorgio Agamben, among many others who 
are now opening the way for a questioning of the incompatibility between the 
recognition of plurality and the afϐirmation of the universality of human rights. 
The recent philosophical interest in a multicultural approach to human rights is a 
response to the “fact of pluralism” and the “reality of globalization.” Multicultural 
societies have made room for the recognition of a variety of cultural and religious 
views linked to minority groups that claim the right to express their identity and 
beliefs in the public sphere. It is, therefore, in light of this wider context that we 
can talk about “multiculturalism, interculturalism, and human rights.”
Having established the current importance of this theme, its polemic impli-
cations, its impact on recent philosophical positions, and my own approach to 
this series of factors, I will now pursue this subject according to three steps. 
First, I introduce the topic of pluralism in terms of multicultural plurality 
and intercultural plurality, which is a way of recognizing a variety of cultural and 
religious worldviews. Second, I discuss the possibility of an overlapping consen-
sus among different cultural and religious views and postulate that many au-
thors see this possible consensus as a way to afϐirm the universality of human 
rights. Finally, I conclude with a proposal for a more plural approach to human 
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rights in which the afϐirmation of plurality of cultures is not seen as incompatible 
with universality of human rights, but rather constitutive to it.
1. A P??????? M???? O? G????? P????????: W????????? A?? T?? 
A???? A??
My initial task is to present a wider interdisciplinary discussion on the com-
patibility of a plurality of cultural and religious worldviews with the universality 
of human rights. Before I delve into this topic, I want to step back and take Karl 
Jaspers’ deϐinition of the Axial Age as the starting point for a consideration of this 
theme. I have at least two reasons for this initiative. First, Jaspers was one of the 
ϐirst in the attempt to perform a “decentering” of Eurocentric views; second, he 
provides us with an interesting suggestion about the simultaneous development 
or co-originality of philosophical and religious worldviews. Despite some of Jas-
pers’ limitations, the concept of axial times has been reassessed today by many 
authors and has an important role in conceptions of cosmopolitanism, human 
rights, religion, and post secularity.
Karl Jaspers began his career by publishing a psychological analysis of 
“worldviews” [Weltbilder] and contrasting them with a philosophical “global in-
tuition” [Weltanschaaung]. In his book Psychology of Global Perspectives [Psycho-
logie der Weltanschaaungen] he deϐines worldviews as patterns based on parti-
cular environments which enable an individual to make sense of objective reality, 
even under conditions of psychopathology (1919:122). Individuals follow such 
cultural patterns that formalize their experiences, deϐine what counts as an au-
thentic life, and help them to pursue their existential goals. In contrast, Jaspers 
conceives of a “global intuition” as something universal, as a philosophically de-
ϐined comprehensive framework that corresponds to “the highest manifestations 
of the human being” (1919:1). It is not surprising, therefore, that the ϐirst volu-
me of Jaspers’ book on philosophy has the subtitle “Philosophical global orien-
tation” [Philosophie 1: Philosophische Weltorientierung] (1932). In this book, he 
concludes that such philosophical comprehensive frameworks orient our global 
orientation and require both our acknowledgement of the ethical and religious 
elements at the core of worldviews and the realization that these worldviews are 
always in communication (1932:392; see Alessiato 2011). 
Jaspers’ considerations on the worldviews and global perspectives of 
groups and civilizations are registered in Origin and Goal of History [Ursprung 
und Ziel der Geschichte]. In this book he deϐines the Axial Age or the axial times 
[Achsenzeit] as “the period around 500 BC, in the spiritual process that occurred 
between 800 and 200 BC” (1949:1), a time in which “a common framework for 
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the historical self-understanding” of humans evolved. He characterized this as 
“an age in which the basic categories emerged, based upon which we still deϐi-
ne our thinking” (1949:19-20). Also here he highlights the plurality of collecti-
ve worldviews and a positive relationship between religious and philosophical 
conceptions. He describes the Axial Age not necessarily as a moment but rather 
as a process of moving from myths to a more abstract and speculative process 
[Vergeisterung] that led to the origins of philosophy. Yet, he does not see this pro-
cess as a necessary development, but rather as a rupture that could be observed 
simultaneously and independently in several high cultures [Hochkulturen] and 
geographic regions such as Persia, India, China, and Greece. His approach is re-
alist enough to acknowledge drawbacks in the history of civilizations but at the 
same time afϐirm the possibility of an evolution in human rights and solidarity. 
For instance, he afϐirms that “one of the preconditions for of humanity is human 
solidarity, illuminated by natural and human law, continually betrayed and for 
ever presenting its demands afresh” (1949:43).
Although Karl Jaspers has been characterized today as “a neglected thinker” 
(Tornhill 2011), his thought on the Axial Age and on the plurality of worldviews 
has recently gained renewed attention. First, there have been several critiques of 
his views, including the charge that he simply generalizes an implicit understan-
ding of Christian religion upon other cultures, that he is limited by the Eurocen-
tric perspectives of his times, and that he does not include Africa in his schema 
of world history (Black 2008). Yet, as Hauke Brunkhorst has stated, despite these 
criticisms – which are to be taken seriously – we can at least assume that Jas-
pers’s approach has helped to perform a decentering of perspectives that is help-
ful today. Second, the concept of Axial Age has been reassessed more approvingly 
in several ways: Shmuel Eisenstadt led a series of initiatives to study the presu-
ppositions and current impact of the axial civilizations and other civilizations in 
the preaxial times – such as Egypt and Mesopotamia (1986); Samuel Huntington 
recognized the plurality of civilizations and their role in a multipolar world, even 
though he concluded that this plurality would lead to a “clash of civilizations” 
(1996:28, 41–55, 183f.); sociologists have reinterpreted the axial times to make 
sense of the tensions between secularism and postsecular societies (Bellah and 
Joas 2012). Finally, Jaspers’s philosophy has been used to reϐlect on the intrinsic 
plurality of perceptions about humanity which inϐluence various conceptions of 
human rights. For Jim Bohman, recent discussions about human rights have given 
much more emphasis on the meaning of rights than to the meaning of human 
because references to human worth, human dignity, and human needs have a 
religious dimension that is deemed too metaphysical or weak as a justiϐication 
for the universality of human rights (Bohman 2007:101f., 105). Bohman relies on 
11FROM PLURAL WORLDVIEWS TO GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v. 1 | n. 1 | p. 7 - 26 | jul./dez. 2015
Jaspers and also on Hannah Arendt to provide an insightful distinction between 
humanness and humanity and qualify the status of what is “human” in human ri-
ghts. In this process, he insists that the plurality of worldviews leads to a plurality 
of political communities – identiϐied as dêmoi – which may offer alternative sel-
f-understandings of modern democracy and the corresponding variety of legal 
frameworks (Bohman 2007). 
Based on all the above, I conclude that Jaspers’ theory can help us set the 
stage for a discussion about a multicultural understanding of human rights and 
plural worldviews. If he is right, contemporary views on human rights are built 
upon deep foundations that can be traced back in centuries and millennia, lea-
ding us back to the cultures of the axial times, and revealing cultural as well as 
religious presuppositions to philosophy, politics, and law. Taking these cultures 
into consideration help us to acknowledge the variety of contemporary world-
views and recognize their plural values. Still, a question remains: Is it possible 
to arrive to universality based on this afϐirmation of pluralism? Today, this ques-
tion concerning the plurality of worldviews and their relationship to religion, 
politics, and law is being afϐirmed by authors as diverse as John Rawls, Martha 
Nussbaum, Hans Küng, Jacques Derrida, Abdullahi An-Naim, Charles Taylor, Seyla 
Benhabib, Jürgen Habermas, and many others. Having taken Karl Jaspers’ deϐini-
tion of the axial times as a way to afϐirm the importance of global plurality, now 
I want to focus on three speciϐic contemporary authors who propose different 
ways of arriving to an “overlapping consensus” among global philosophical and 
plural worldviews. They provide important concepts that help us make sense of 
the relationship between human rights, communities, and what I deϐine as mul-
ticultural and intercultural plurality. 
2. O?????????? C????????: F??? P????? W?????????
T? U???????? O? H???? R?????
Karl Jaspers’ deϐinition of the Axial Age offers us an initial of map of global 
cultures which can be worked out and expanded. Based upon this map we can 
afϐirm the simultaneity of philosophical and religious worldviews as well as the 
importance of global plurality from the beginning. This serves as framework wi-
thin which we can insert current discussions about human rights. In this section, 
I attempt to trace how John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and Charles Taylor ad-
dress religious themes in their work and defend the possibility of an overlapping 
consensus among different worldviews.
This step is important for several reasons. First, these authors try to answer 
the question concerning the possibility of upholding universality amidst the re-
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cognition of plurality, including the plurality of religious groups and convictions. 
Second, they avoid top-down approaches by understanding universality as the 
result of bottom-up and more democratic “overlapping consensus” that emerges 
from an intercultural dialogue among representatives of different cultural and 
religious traditions. Third, they reveal in their own writings how cultural and 
even religious elements can operate as underlying backgrounds that inϐluence 
contemporary philosophical positions. Finally, they provide a good example for 
the very point I am trying to make because they seem to arrive to an overlapping 
consensus regarding the possibility of afϐirming the universality of human rights, 
even though they arrive at this similar conclusion through different ways and 
means.
2.1. F??? T?? F??? O? P???????? T? A? O?????????? C????????
In political philosophy, Rawls has been one of the ϐirst to take comprehen-
sive worldviews into account, challenge the role of religious views in politics, 
but nevertheless propose the possibility of an overlapping consensus about 
basic values brought forth by such views. Although Rawls’ A Theory of Justice 
states that justice should not be considered as a common good given by nature 
or dispensed by God – as traditional societies believe – but rather as a “way in 
which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls 1971: 7), 
he later provides more room for cultural and religious considerations as well as 
reϐlections on how this relates to human rights.
A clear initial movement in this direction can be observed in his article 
“Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” (1985), where he refers to the 
Protestant Reformation and the religious wars over conϐlicting conceptions 
of the good as a problem whose solution required religious tolerance and a 
more unbiased political conception of justice. Based on this example he deϐines 
justice as fairness and envisions it as the practical agreement among free and 
equal citizens within a democratic regime, an agreement that requires us to 
“to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious, ques-
tions” (1985:230). Accordingly, social cooperation cannot emerge from God’s 
law or from the afϐirmation of comprehensive moral doctrines, but rather from 
the impartial perspective of the “original position” in which individuals refrain 
from expressing their contingencies and worldviews by assuming the “veil of 
ignorance” (1985:235). 
In a second moment, registered in “The idea of an Overlapping Consensus” 
(1987), we observe a clearer turn to pluralism as Rawls moves beyond this initial 
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proviso and afϐirms the possibility of a wider agreement among plural world-
views through a process in which “different and even conϐlicting doctrines afϐirm 
the publicly shared basis of political arrangement,” even if they accept justice as 
fairness for different reasons (1985:246, 248-249; 1987:4). Religious views are 
one example of comprehensive doctrines that can be acceptable if they do not 
contradict political expectations of religious tolerance and of the right to indi-
vidual “liberty of conscience.” This accommodation indicates an important step 
towards the recognition of differences, but as Will Kymlicka argues, in order to 
search for an unbiased standpoint Rawls provides a somewhat biased account of 
tolerance that does not account for plural group rights (1992). 
These considerations are then expanded and synthesized in Political Libe-
ralism, where Rawls continues to reject metaphysics but accommodates the plu-
rality of opposing and incommensurable conceptions by accepting the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism” (1993:36). Also here he has much to say about religion, 
especially as he deϐines moral, philosophical, and religious “background cul-
tures” as comprehensive doctrines with similar standing (1993:37-43). While 
he continues to insist on the primacy of a political conception of liberalism, he 
now adds the possibility of accepting such comprehensive doctrines as part of a 
possible consensus, provided that they are translated into a free-standing poli-
tical conception of justice compatible with constitutional democratic principles 
(1993:59). This “overlapping consensus” should not be confused with the despo-
tic consensus of Catholic universalism (1993:xxif.) but postulated as a political con-
ception of justice that can be accepted by different religious, cultural and philoso-
phical views – under the condition that these views are “reasonable” (1993:36-37). 
One interesting point is that Rawls comes closer to Jaspers when he distinguishes 
between “fully comprehensive” and “partially comprehensive” views. He is more 
concerned with the former and the possibility of translating fully comprehensive 
claims into constitutional principles. This can be seen, for example, in the case of 
a religious doctrine that afϐirms liberal political values such as the principle of to-
leration and liberty of conscience. Modern society allows for a learning process in 
which citizens may uphold both the principles of justice recognized in constitutio-
nal democracies and other cultural and religious views: “Should an incompatibility 
later be recognized between the principles of justice and their wider doctrines, 
then they might very well adjust or revise these doctrines rather than reject those 
principles” (1993:160). Even though Rawls subsequently provides slight revisions 
of this requirement, the general point remains roughly the same: “reasonable com-
prehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be introduced in public poli-
tical discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons – 
and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are 
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sufϐicient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are said to support” 
(1997:783). 
This understanding has profound implications for Rawls’ conception of hu-
man rights. In The Law of Peoples, where he goes from the national application of 
political liberalism to its implementation in the international arena – thus being 
more directly confronted with a much wider plurality of conϐlicting comprehen-
sive doctrines – he tends to see human rights as an extension or generalization 
of liberal principles (1999:37). Although he does make room for other political 
cultures of “decent peoples” in hierarchical societies and acknowledges the pli-
ght of “burdened societies, “in the end religious views are unimportant for him. 
On the one hand, he says, “liberal peoples by their constitution have no religion 
– they are not confessional states – even if their citizens are highly religious, indi-
vidually or together” (1999:24, 47); on the other, he even adds that “the fact that 
women’s status is often founded on religion, or bear a close relation to religious 
views, is not in itself a cause of their subjection, since other causes are usually 
present” (1999:110). This is surely a controversial point, among many others he 
afϐirms in The Law of Peoples, which are criticized by several authors.
Let us focus on the issue of religion and secularization. The point that reli-
gious views can be taken into account only if they are translated into the accep-
table language of political liberalism may be valid as a description of particular 
regions in contemporary United States – such as New England or the Northwest. 
This cannot be generalized, much less globally. One may ask: Are there cases in 
which political principles are adapted in order to accommodate religious views? 
Also in the United States we ϐind many examples of this practice, as shown by 
Robert Bellah in his analysis of “civil religion” (1967). Rawls could counter-ar-
gue that he is not proposing a description but rather a normative framework, 
a proposal on how society should be. Still, my point is that this normative ideal 
emerges historically from a particular comprehensive view whose roots can be 
identiϐied with speciϐic religious views regarding individuality which are indeb-
ted to European Protestantism and this conception of individuality and eventu-
ally became enshrined in a constitution. Therefore, one may characterize a kind 
of “constitutional privilege” of Protestantism in the United States, despite all the 
efforts of the Founding Fathers to frame the Constitution from a more impartial 
point of view. Let me expand on this point: If Christianity has a constitutional 
privilege in the constitutions of Western democracies, this would not be much 
different from incorporating shari’a law into constitutions of Islamic countries or 
upholding Confucian values as core to the political system in China. This may ex-
plain why there are various examples of legal cases, court decisions, and political 
practices in the United States that implicitly and explicitly reiterate mainstream 
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Protestantism as the norm from which minority religions or non-religious indivi-
duals and groups deviate, although the American Constitution promotes the free 
exercise of religious freedom and the separation of church and state as impartial 
measures. 
I am not necessarily questioning individuality, but rather afϐirming that the 
value of individuality cannot be taken for granted. If this religious inϐiltration 
into legal and political language seems unavoidable, then it may be better to be 
open and upfront about it, submitting these contingencies to public scrutiny as 
well. In fact, today we can see that there are clear religious presuppositions to 
many of Rawls’ concepts. With the posthumous publication of his undergraduate 
thesis at Princeton University, much light has been shed on his religious views 
as well as the implicit worldview guiding his philosophy. From today’s perspec-
tive, it is possible to trace his views on justice and morality to his senior thesis, 
A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the 
Concept of Community (2009). This text was subject to analysis in an introduction 
by Thomas Nagel and by other authors who reveal the likely religious roots of 
his deontological approach and his emphasis on basic individual rights (Gregory 
2007; Habermas 2012:257–276). However, an important point in his views at 
this early stage of his thinking is the deϐinition of an ethical standpoint based on 
the Christian doctrine of love. This means that Rawls relies on a comprehensive 
doctrine to establish the interdependence between individual and community 
and criticize an egotistical “bargain-contract society” that uses other people as 
means and creates a state of fear and distrust (Rawls 2009:110–113, 229). Based 
on this assumption, Rawls afϐirms the importance of a religious community and 
states clearly that “Christian morality is morality in community, whether it be the 
earthly community or the heavenly community [. . .] This fact means that man can 
never escape community, and therefore is always responsible and always under 
obligations” (Rawls 2009:122). 
This conclusion appears to be in radical contrast with the framework Rawls 
established in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993) because 
in previous works he questions metaphysical assumptions, upholds the separa-
tion of church and state, and replaces the religious premises of the Golden Rule 
with a principle of fairness. Yet, as Thomas Nagel recognizes, there is a common 
thread in all these proposals, which is the search for a comprehensive outlook 
about the social world which can also be interpreted in their relation to religious 
terms (Nagel, in Rawls 2009:5). For instance, Rawls’ earlier views on the abso-
lute value of the individual and the universal-egalitarian ethical obligations pro-
moted through the Christian religion (Habermas 2012:57) are presented in A 
Theory of Justice by using the corresponding concepts of “person” and “society. 
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“Instead of having God as the instance for societal stability, this role is shifted to 
the institutions of a democratic and well-ordered society. 
What can we learn from this? Although the subtle changes observed above, 
from A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith through A Theory of Justice 
to Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples can be interpreted as a learning 
process and a progressive translation of religious categories into impartial poli-
tical concepts, the fact that Rawls later makes room for comprehensive views ac-
tually puts him back on track and offers an important insight regarding multicul-
tural and postsecular societies. We can actually ϐind a coherent line in his works, 
which indicates a possible compatibility between religious worldviews and the 
views of a secularized liberal state. What we need are better global criteria to 
evaluate the issues at stake. A possible overlapping consensus on the universality 
of human rights can serve as reference for this task. 
2.2. R???????? D???????? A?? T?? C???????? A????? A 
C????????????? F???????? 
From a legal perspective, Martha Nussbaum brings more compelling argu-
ments for the possibility of being upfront about religious issues, accommodating 
these issues into the legal framework of a liberal society, and promoting plurality 
and human rights beyond national limits. Although she criticizes Rawls views 
on human rights, especially because he uses a limiting “language of rights” and 
allows for discriminations against women when he accepts the legitimacy of de-
cent nonliberal peoples in the hypothetical land of Kazanistan (Nussbaum 2006), 
she agrees with Rawls’ deϐinition of justice as fairness and his proposal for an 
overlapping consensus. Moreover, instead of going around the issue of religion, 
as Rawls seemed to have done in his approach to this subject, she addresses the 
relationship between politics, religion, and law head on, focusing on religious 
equality and the right to freedom of conscience as conditions for a fair multi-
cultural society (2008:62). She thus addresses important points that seem to be 
missing in political liberalism and complement her own previous writings by ex-
plicitly addressing questions of religious identity and convictions. 
First, in her writings on human rights, Nussbaum questions the limits of the 
liberal discourses emphasizing “rights” and insists on the need to highlight the 
human dimension at play in global human rights, including the role of emotions, 
the dimension of sexuality, and the acceptance of disabilities (Nussbaum 2000, 
2004b). Moreover, she questions whether only impartial individuals have rights 
and adds groups and particular gendered identities into the discussion. She starts 
with the assumption that humans are not necessarily equal (2001a:212–213), 
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but have differences that need to be recognized and compensated in certain si-
tuations, so that individuals and groups such as women, peoples with disability, 
and ethnic or religious minorities may be able to pursue their full potential as 
humans (2001b:97–98), claiming rights to life, bodily health, senses and imagi-
nation, emotions and friendship, and play and control over one’s environment 
(2001b:98–101). Because the liberal language of rights is limited and fails to ad-
dress these issues, Nussbaum develops her “capabilities approach” (2001b). 
Second, Nussbaum also expands human rights by relating it more directly 
to cosmopolitanism, which prompts her to question patriotism and criticize the 
limited scope of a national constitutional framework (1996). As Nussbaum has 
reminded us, one of the earliest and most important references to human rights 
is the cosmopolitanism of Diogenes of Sinope, who was one of the ϐirst to express 
the idea of being a citizen of the cosmos while bound by local contingencies (Nus-
sbaum 1997). According to this view, humans are citizens of two communities: 
“The local community of our birth and the community of human argument and 
aspiration” (Nussbaum 1997:29). It is in light of these premises that we can un-
derstand how Nussbaum performs a turn to religion similar to Rawls’, but with 
an even greater commitment to pluralism and group identity.
Finally, in her book Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition 
of Religious Equality (2008), Nussbaum expands the framework once more. She 
starts by explicitly afϐirming her identity as a Christian who later converted to Ju-
daism and as a scholar who studies India and is familiar with the struggle of Hin-
du, Buddhist, and Muslim immigrants to the United States (2003:9-39; 2008:14). 
Based on the evidence that these religious minorities suffer discrimination and 
are targeted with extra burden when their convictions clash with the existing 
legal framework inϐluenced by the Protestant culture in the United States, Nuss-
baum upholds the American tradition of “liberty of conscience” since the works 
of Roger Williams in the 17th century (2008:19-20, 51-58). Also here she needs 
to come to terms with political liberalism. For instance, she challenges a strict 
separation between church and state because this would lead to a situation of 
profound unfairness and promote an unfounded aversion to or marginalization 
of certain religious expressions (2008:11). Her argument, therefore, is that an 
implicit constitutional privilege contradicts the principles of justice proposed by 
Rawls. In her interpretation, the separation of church and state should be a devi-
ce to protect minority religions and avoid that groups such as evangelical Chris-
tianity afϐirm their ideology as the state religion in the United States. 
After historical considerations that lead to an analysis of how religious 
liberty was framed in the Constitution of the United States, Nussbaum dis-
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cusses the needs of religious minorities – such as Quakers, Mennonites, Jews, 
and Amish, Mormons, Muslims and Jehova Witnesses –, especially when their 
beliefs conϐlict with the government requirements such as military service, 
revelation of private confessions, and the observation of particular holidays 
(2008:116-130). There are many cases involving conϐlicts between religious 
minorities and constitutional clauses aiming at accommodating differences, 
but constitutional processes have a tendency to penalize those who cannot ar-
ticulate their claims well because they are foreigners, immigrants or minorities 
who do not master the “language of rights.” These groups do not have the pri-
vilege of having their worldviews projected onto the Constitution. Moreover, 
initiatives such as the “Pledge of Allegiance” (2008:199-214) and educational 
policies that impose a particular evangelical culture in public institutions, es-
pecially in the area of education, disrespect the culture of minority groups and 
contradict the liberal precept of liberty of conscience (2008:224ff.). 
What would be the difference to highlight between Nussbaum and Rawls? 
In the end, Nussbaum reaffirms the primacy of political liberalism and its 
commitment to uphold fairness (2008:172-173), but she attempts to make 
it more compatible with en explicit commitment to religious equality. She si-
des with Rawls and accepts the idea of an “overlapping consensus” because 
“citizens themselves will rarely separate their understanding of the political 
conception from the comprehensive doctrine they love” (2008:362). Also, she 
considers this turn compatible with her previous work, not only because “li-
berty of conscience” has its background in Stoic philosophy and cosmopoli-
tanism (2008:76-84), but also because there is a legal tradition in American 
culture that shows an ongoing process of more than 400 years to guarantee 
freedom of religion. Precisely due to this legacy, citizens need to be vigilant 
and avoid that this process be undermined by changing political circumstan-
ces. Nussbaum is careful enough to add a proviso that her focus on American 
culture is not an exercise in patriotism, but rather a celebration of the depth 
and ethical value of American constitutional tradition (2008:32). Yet, it is fair 
to say that she stops short of providing a model to promote an overlapping 
consensus beyond this particular context. Moreover, she does not account for 
cases of legal pluralism in which the precepts of different constitutional fra-
meworks clash and require a higher instance to address such intercultural 
conflicts. This shortcoming gives me the opportunity to introduce Charles 
Taylor and review his conception of multicultural and intercultural plurality 
as well as his postulate of a possible universal consensus on human rights in-
volving Western and non-Western cultures. This brings us back to the points 
developed earlier by Karl Jaspers.
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2.3. T?? S?????? A??, M???????????????, A?? T?? I???????????? 
C???????? O? H???? R?????
Charles Taylor not only establishes a clearer dialogue with Karls Jaspers’ 
idea of axial times, but also criticizes Rawls’ liberalism and expands some of the 
points brought up by Martha Nussbaum regarding religious identity. Differently 
from them, however, he clearly afϐirms his hermeneutical conditionings from the 
beginning, controversially stating his identity as a practicing Catholic in a multi-
cultural society as Canada. He afϐirmed his position early enough, in his debates 
on Marxism and secularization (Taylor 1958, 1960), and then radicalized a con-
fessional tone in later writings (2007). Taylor raises provocative and controver-
sial apologetic claims in relation to Latin Christianity, but his position has the 
merit of identifying hidden religious premises in accepted social developments, 
presenting challenges to secularism and secularization theories, and proposing 
the concept of “immanent frame” as the wider “context in which we develop our 
beliefs” (2007:549).
A ϐirst important point to reiterate is that Taylor is never shy of the deep 
religious roots that inform his motivations. He presents them by means of phi-
losophical arguments indebted to the hermeneutic tradition that goes from the 
so-called three H’s—Johann G. Hamann, Johann G. Herder, and Wilhelm von 
Humboldt – to the theories of meaning in Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Gadamer 
(Taylor 1985a). These philosophers provide him with a tool to question the over-
ly individualistic and instrumental views of modernity in political liberalism, 
which occlude the anthropological conditionings of the self, forget how indivi-
dual agency and identity depend on the particular language and culture of a lo-
calized historical experience, and lead to a loss of meaning, cultural expressivity, 
and freedom (Taylor 1991:1-12, 25-30). This leads to his differences with Rawls. 
Because Rawls’ liberalism is the political heir of these modern views, he is the 
constant target of Taylor’s critique: He questions liberal “atomism, “rejects ethi-
cal subjectivism, and opposes the primacy of individualistic rights over collective 
conceptions of the good (1985b:187-209; 1995:181-202). Moreover, he takes the 
concepts of freedom and “recognition” [Anerkennung] from Hegel to develop a 
proposal for identity politics and group rights (Taylor 1975; Taylor and Gutman 
1992). 
Second, this leads to both his proximity and difference in relation to Nus-
sbaum’s position. With his proposal for group rights, Taylor’s conception of 
communitarian plurality is not limited to a given tradition but expanded into both 
multiculturalism and interculturalism, a move inspired by the particular case of 
Québec and the constitutional debates for a multicultural Canada in the 1960s, 
which he connects to other facts and events in Europe (Taylor and Gutman 1992; 
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2012). He does agree with the importance of equality. For him, “equal recogni-
tion is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal 
can inϐlict damage on those who are denied it” (Taylor and Gutman 1992:36). 
However, he does not think impartiality is the answer. Rather, the antidote to ine-
quality is a “politics of difference” that recognizes distinctions, opposes assimi-
lation, and creates afϐirmative policies to avoid or rectify oppression (1992:58). 
In this regard, Taylor and Nussbaum seem to agree, but Taylor goes a bit farther. 
Third, Taylor afϐirms that “some of the reasons that make interculturalism 
right for Quebec apply also to some European countries” (2012:422) and ampli-
ϐies his communitarianism to the international level. For sure, Taylor is still bou-
nd to a North Atlantic context that cannot be generalized. Intercultural dialogue 
is not simply internal to the Canadian society or the North American context, 
with interesting parallels in Europe. Nevertheless, he does mention the Turkish 
guest workers [Gastarbeiterinnen] in Germany who want to be integrated in ter-
ms of citizenship but also want to maintain their cultural and religious identity. 
He also advances a discussion about an intercultural “consensus on human ri-
ghts” in Asia (1999:124-144). In his view, the recognition of different cultural, 
religious, and philosophical worldviews has become available for renewed inter-
pretation, appropriation, and renewal. By making sense of the intercultural inte-
raction among different communities and cultures, he envisions the acceptance 
and implementation of human rights in non-Western societies that have denoun-
ced human rights as a Western imposition. The acceptance of the universality of 
human rights requires, however, an appropriate philosophical justiϐication that 
recognizes the particular historical and cultural context in which human rights 
are being applied (1999). This can be done, according to Taylor, if we differentia-
te the legal understanding of human rights in liberalism from the deeper philoso-
phical worldviews that underlie distinct legal frameworks. As we have seen, this 
question leads invariably to a discussion about religious worldviews.
Finally, all these elements are brought together in his account of religion and 
the secular age. A Secular Age begins by viewing secularity in way that encom-
passes the various forms of secularism and secularization implicitly mentioned 
by Rawls and Nussbaum. Taylor deϐines them as follows: “secularity 1” corres-
ponds to the privatization of religion, “secularity 2” is the decline of religious 
practice in general, and “secularity 3” is the recognition that religious beliefs can 
be challenged and, therefore, need to be justiϐied in relation to the “whole context 
of understanding in which our moral, spiritual, or religious experience and sear-
ch takes place” (2007:2-3). Due to his own hermeneutical conditioning, Taylor 
concentrates on his own culture as an example, attempting to reveal the under-
lying foundations of his own thinking. The search for underlying worldviews has 
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taken various forms in Taylor’s work. One example is his research on the sources 
of the “Self” in modern Europe, in which he reveals a particular conception of the 
human being that places higher value on individuality and deϐines society in ter-
ms of a contractual agreement among individuals who are endowed with rights 
(1989), but at the same time he recognizes that the goal of having an individual 
as the subject of rights and of establishing the foundations of society on mutual 
cooperation and a legal order has been achieved in other societies by other me-
ans (Taylor 1999:134). Another example is his narrative about the “secular age, 
“in which he shows the evolution of worldviews as “social imaginary, “reveals 
a “disembedding” process through which a particular Protestant conception of 
individuality inϐluences society in such a way that “society itself comes to be re-
conceived as made up of individuals” (2007:146), and . Also here, he criticizes 
Rawls and political liberalism for not recognizing their own particular religious 
worldview and the fact that other cultures have other contingencies. Neverthe-
less, Taylor agrees with Rawls’ proposal for an overlapping consensus as a means 
to afϐirm the universality ethics, democracy, and human rights (2007:532). This 
consensus requires, however, that we acknowledge “the immanent frame, “which 
is the conditional “sensed context in which we develop our beliefs” (2007:13). 
For Taylor, the very idea of a secular age is the result of a religious development 
that we should not neglect.
Despite the impressive breadth of his philosophical interests and the scope 
of his considerations on the secular age, many criticisms can be brought against 
Charles Taylor. For instance, many see his views as too apologetic. Moreover, his 
historical reading of Latin Christendom appears selective (Butler 2010:193f.), 
for he does not include, for example, the developments of Catholicism in Latin 
America or Eastern Europe. Also, he fails to account for the colonial component 
in his historical narrative, not realizing that what he cherishes as “Latin Chris-
tendom” is the result of the encounter with heterogeneous cultures (Mahmood 
2010:285). This brings us back to the beginning of my discussion about the 
plurality of worldviews and the possibility of afϐirming their universality, pro-
vided that we avoid these types of biases by recognizing global plurality from 
the beginning. This is what we can learn when we compare these ideas with Karl 
Jaspers’ decentered model of co-original philosophies and religious during the 
axial times. In fact, Taylor explicitly refers to the Axial Revolution to question the 
primacy of individual rights and afϐirm that “perhaps the most fundamental no-
velty of all is the revisionary stance towards the human good in Axial religions” 
(2007:152). This assertion cannot be made en passant, but needs to be afϐirmed 
from the beginning, so that we maintain plurality as a critical condition for a le-
gitimate overlapping consensus.
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3. P???????, L??, A?? P????? W????????? I? 
R??????? T? H???? R?????
Going from Rawls through Nussbaum to Taylor we can have a glimpse 
of various arguments for the recognition of a plurality of cultural and reli-
gious worldviews and the concomitant assumption of a possible “overlapping 
consensus” among different traditions that could accept the universality of 
human rights. Based on their positions, this consensus is only possible if hu-
man rights are not simply limited to the language of rights and if political and 
legal frameworks make room for the expression of fully comprehensive views 
– including religious worldviews. There are obvious challenges involved in 
maintaining both aspects together: if human rights are limited to a liberal 
conception of individual rights, then group identities and collective concerns 
may not received appropriate attention; conversely, if emphasis is given to 
group rights and communitarian structures, individual autonomy may be li-
mited. It makes sense, therefore, to have a broader heuristic that requires us 
to have both dimensions simultaneously. 
While Rawls tends more towards individuality and has progressively ope-
ned his views to the dimension of collectivity – including the expression of re-
ligious views –, his conception of human rights appears more as a projection of 
a particular national framework of a liberal society upon the international area. 
Nussbaum makes a more decisive move towards both the recognition of indivi-
dual capabilities and group rights – especially minorities with their respective 
religious views – while upholding the universality of an ethical and cosmopo-
litan position as the standard upon which individuals and groups are to be jud-
ged. Taylor criticizes the liberal emphasis on individualism but goes further in 
afϐirming the plurality of multicultural and intercultural interactions. Although 
he is less emphatic in his endorsing of universality, he does provide a model of 
recognition of otherness that has the potential to be applied globally. It is easy 
to see that these positions have different strengths, speciϐic gaps, and a certain 
complementarity because, taken altogether, they provide different reasons to su-
pport individual autonomy, collective recognition, multicultural and intercultural 
dialogue, and a possible consensus on the meaning of universality. Moreover, at 
each juncture we ϐind a speciϐic understanding of religion connected to these va-
rious levels. Thus, religion can be understood as private individual faith based on 
freedom of conscience, collective identity based on shared beliefs, intercultural 
interactions based tolerance for differences, and ethical values – justiϐied diffe-
rently by various worldviews – that can claim universality if they are the result of 
an overlapping consensus.
23FROM PLURAL WORLDVIEWS TO GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v. 1 | n. 1 | p. 7 - 26 | jul./dez. 2015
Taken alone, neither of the positions we discussed can cover all of these points. 
Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to advance some of their ideas and articulate the-
se various dimensions by relating them to discussions on human rights at the global 
level while respecting distinctive ways of understanding human rights in different 
cultures. In the end, all the authors reviewed afϐirm the possibility of an overlapping 
consensus regarding human rights which would also include non-western societies, 
provided that the involved parts offer appropriate philosophical justiϐications that 
recognize multiculturalism and are compatible with the historical or cultural context 
in which human rights are being applied. Thus, in the same ways as the development 
of modernity in Europe required an appropriation of Judeo-Christian values, basic 
human rights can be justiϐied from within particular cultures that possess the poten-
tial to agree on fundamental values that can be shared across cultures. This brings us 
back to the framework I established at the beginning with the help of Karl Jaspers. 
For example, the ancient thinking of Confucius in China or the pre-Socratics in Greece 
was deϐinitely metaphysical, but implied some notions of humanity and rights and 
duties that underlie contemporary positions. Modern European philosophy was in-
ϐluenced by both a Christian conception of humanity and a scientiϐic and secularized 
naturalism that deϐined rights in a more individualistic fashion. How can we explo-
re this perspective without falling into the problems of particularism and relativism 
that contradict universality? In my view, we need an even wider framework that up-
dates the points we retrieved from Jaspers’ consideration of the axial time and inte-
grates the contributions we have from the different philosophers I discussed above. 
Based on these considerations, I conclude with a simple suggestion that ad-
vances some of the points presented by the philosophers mentioned above – es-
pecially Charles Taylor – and provides a model to articulate these various issues 
in a programmatic way.
First, I believe it is necessary to go beyond the impression that there we are 
only bound to our particular community and the elements that prevail in one’s 
historical, cultural, and linguistic horizon. Rather, I propose that we recognize 
that there are different simultaneous communities in interaction and sometimes 
even in conϐlict, in such a way that we can also acknowledge the possibility of 
learning from them because they may mirror different aspects of the universality 
of human rights, albeit never completely. For instance, there could be fragments 
of an ideal of freedom which can be brought together by means of intercultural 
communication. Also, an ideal universality can be conceived only as a consensual 
sum of these fragments available in different cultures. Moreover, there is also 
the need for the clariϐication of one’s individual situation amid the plurality of 
communities: the existence of democratic institutions may be given in a commu-
nity but an additional aspect such as the openness to and afϐirmative tolerance 
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of distinct cultural forms can be given in another. Consequently, their understan-
ding of rights can have different but complementary dimensions.
Contemporary views on human rights are built upon deep foundations in 
shared community values that can be traced back to developments that occurred 
not only in the past decades, but also in the last centuries and millennia. As we 
have seen in Jaspers’ considerations on the Axial Times, these positions have sur-
vived centuries of transformation and adapted to new and contemporary situa-
tions, being always in ϐlux. To value this reality that has been understood as “the 
fact of pluralism” we need to account for the plurality of communities. However, 
it is important to realize that this plurality has at least a double dimension: I 
understand plurality not simply as the inner variety proper of multicultural so-
cieties but also as the outer variety that emerges through intercultural relations. 
This recognition of intercultural plurality as distinct from multicultural plurality 
brings a new set of challenges and has been the topic of intensive debates regar-
ding human rights discourses, especially because some cultural traditions charge 
that the repertoire of rights deϐined in the new paradigm established by the Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights reϐlects values that go back to the European 
Enlightenment or to Christianity alone, thus revealing a problematic Eurocentric 
bias. As a result, new regional cultural discourses have emerged and appealed to 
speciϐic interpretations of rights and humanity, which are now being retrieved to 
orient and update discourses on human rights in particular settings.
Thus, I conclude that we ought to expand our reϐlections on the relationship 
between plurality and universality in human rights according to two steps. First, we 
need to differentiate between inner multicultural plurality and outer intercultural 
plurality; second, we need to connect this plurality to philosophical paradigms that 
help us to differentiate, acknowledge, accept, or criticize the plurality conceptions of 
human rights presented in the global context. Of course, this is a proposal that needs 
to be worked out in more detail. But I hope to have showed, with the help of philoso-
phers such as John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and Charles Taylor, that this search for 
a possible overlapping consensus on human rights is a promising project.
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